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: Sex Reassignment Surgery & the New Standard of Care

SEX REASSIGNMENT SURGERY & THE NEW STANDARD OF CARE:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM, THE
STATES, SOCIETY, AND THE MEDICAL COMMUNITY SERVE IN
PAVING THE WAY FOR INCARCERATED TRANSGENDERED
PERSONS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SEX CHANGE
Victor J. Genchi*
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the past couple of years, the United States has taken incredible bounds
toward achieving equality for all citizens—particularly, the lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender (LGBT) community. For instance, the Supreme Court of the United
States held same sex couples have a constitutional right to marry.1 Similarly, the
transgender community in particular is in the national spotlight in part because of
Olympic gold medalist Caitlyn Jenner’s decision to share her transition (male-tofemale) with the world.2 The nation’s overwhelming push toward unanimous
embrace and acceptance of the LGBT community3 is evidence of our ever evolving
society.4
Similarly, the prison system in the United States is experiencing an evolution in
the way it is required to care for transgender inmates.5 Gender dysphoria (GD) is a
________________________
*
Barry University School of Law Juris Doctor Candidate, Spring 2017. I would like to recognize and
extend my sincerest appreciation to all members of Barry Law Review for their hard work and dedication in editing
this article, to Professor Terri Day for sharing her unique perspective, and to my wife Kelly Genchi and our four
wonderful children—the motivation behind everything I do in life.
1.
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
2.
Austin Ramzy, Caitlyn Jenner Says She’ll Push for Acceptance of Transgender People, N.Y. TIMES (July
16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/us/caitlyn-jenner-says-shell-push-for-tolerance-of-transgenderpeople.html.
3.
But see Danielle Weatherby, From Jack to Jill: Gender Expression As Protected Speech in the Modern
Schoolhouse, 39 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 89, 128 (2015) (“While transgender individuals are becoming more
prevalent in pop culture, transgender youth remain at risk, still plagued by high rates of violence.”). Additionally,
see the Weatherby article for a comprehensive discussion on how gender expression—including bathroom use in
public schools—should be protected speech under the First Amendment. Id. at 119–28.
4.
See generally Alex Tribou & Keith Collins, This Is How Fast America Changes Its Mind, BLOOMBERG
(June 26, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-pace-of-social-change/ (comparing the relatively rapid
period of time American society and the legal system have taken in mandating a constitutional right to same-sex
marriage with other civil rights milestones). For instance, only “[e]leven years after Massachusetts became the first
state to allow same-sex couples to marry” in 2004, in 2015 the Supreme Court declared states cannot deny same-sex
couples the right to marry. Id. In contrast, it took nineteen years after California struck down its ban on interracial
marriage, in 1948, for the Supreme Court to rule in 1967 that states could not prohibit interracial marriage. Id.
5.
See generally Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 553, 559 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that a Wisconsin statute
preventing Department of Corrections medical staff from providing hormone therapy to prisoners diagnosed with
Gender Dysmorphia (GD) constituted deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution); South v. Gomez, No. CV-95-01070-DFL, 2000 WL 222611, at *1,
*2 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 2000) (concluding that state corrections officers acted with deliberate indifference by abruptly
terminating the provision of female hormone therapy to a prisoner diagnosed with GD).
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term used to describe a medical condition characterized by an incongruence between
one’s expressed gender and assigned sex at birth.6 Left untreated, people with GD
experience anxiety, depression, suicidality, and other mental health issues.7 The
World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) has promulgated
Standards of Care (the SOCs), which describe the appropriate treatment for GD.8 In
some instances, changes in gender expression and role, hormone therapy, and
psychotherapy are a sufficient treatment; however, in severe cases, sexual
reassignment surgery (SRS) is the only appropriate treatment.9 State prison systems
have not—until recently—permitted inmates with GD who meet the SOC criteria to
receive SRS.10 As a result, inmates have used the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution to allege state
prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to their serious medical “need” for
SRS.11
In congruence with transgendered prisoner’s recent assertions of a medical need
for SRS is the ever evolving non-originalist interpretation of the United States
Constitution. Non-originalists believe the Constitution is a “living document” and
judges should interpret it beyond the original intent of the Framers.12 Particularly,
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishments is interpreted in this way.13 Moreover, in conformity with
non-originalists’ views, judges look to contemporary standards when deciding cases
involving governmental processes such as treatment of prisoners’ medical conditions
while incarcerated.14 Contemporary standards are never fixed and will expand and
contract with societal values.15 Chief Justice Warren stated:
[C]ruel and unusual . . . the basic policy reflected in these words is
firmly established in the Anglo-American tradition of criminal
justice. The phrase in our Constitution was taken directly from the
English Declaration of Rights of 1688, and the principle it represents
can be traced back to the Magna Carta. The basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity
of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment
________________________
6.
Karl
Bryant,
Gender
Dysphoria
(GD),
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/science/gender-dysphoria (last visted Oct. 1, 2016).
7.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 454, 457–
59 (5th ed. 2013).
8.
See generally WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE
HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE (7th Version 2011)
[hereinafter SOC].
9.
Id. at 9–10, 54–55.
10.
Paige St. John, In a First, California Agrees to Pay for Transgender Inmate’s Sex Reassignment, L.A.
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-inmate-transgender-20150810-story.html.
11.
See, e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 200 (D. Mass. 2012); see also Norsworthy v. Beard,
87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
(Aug.
29,
2005),
12.
See
Jack
M.
Balkin,
Alive
and
Kicking,
SLATE
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2005/08/alive_and_kicking.single.html.
13.
See id.
14.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
15.
See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of
civilized standards. Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be
imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but any
technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is
constitutionally suspect . . . . [T]he words of the Amendment are not
precise, and that their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.16
These contemporary standards of interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause have evolved drastically over the past two
centuries.17 Providing transgender prisoners with adequate medical care is now well
within the Eighth Amendment’s purview. For instance, in Kosilek v. Spencer
(Kosilek I) and Norsworthy v. Beard, two separate United States district courts
granted the inmates’ requests for an injunction because they found SRS medically
necessary and the Department of Corrections (DOC) acted with deliberate
indifference when it denied SRS to WPATH qualified transgender prisoners.18 In
Kosilek I, the earlier of the two cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit reversed because it found the DOC’s choice to provide non-surgical
treatment such as hormones, electrolysis, and physiotherapy adequately treated
GD.19 However, in the latter case, the California Governor released Norsworthy—a
convicted murderer—on parole one day before the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit was set to hear the case.20 Following Norsworthy’s release, on
August 10, 2015, the State of California became the first state in the nation to agree
to pay for an inmate’s SRS.21 Inmate Shiloh Quine, who is spending life in prison
for committing first-degree murder, will receive taxpayer-financed SRS.22 Postsurgery, she will be housed in a female prison.23
Part II of this comment embarks on a demonstration of the historical progression
of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments case
law. Next, Part III delves into the inherent problems interwoven into giving
incarcerated GD sufferers SRS and how society, the states, and the medical field may
have already resolved them. And finally, Part IV outlines why SRS will be a
constitutionally protected right for prisoners with GD who qualify under the
WPATH SOCs.
________________________
16.
Id. at 99–101 (emphasis added).
17.
See generally Daniel Yves Hall, The Eighth Amendment, Prison Conditions and Social Context, 58 MO.
L. REV. 207, 207–08 (1993) (detailing the history of the Eighth Amendment and how societal changes influence
evolving interpretation).
18.
See Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 237–38, 250–51 (D. Mass. 2012); Norsworthy v. Beard,
87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1187, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
19.
See Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 69–70, 96 (1st Cir. 2014).
20.
Associated Press, Transgender California Inmate Seeking Sex Reassignment Surgery Freed from Prison
After Parole, FOX NEWS (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/08/12/transgender-california-inmateseeking-sex-reassignment-surgery-freed-from/.
21.
St. John, supra note 10.
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
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II. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF WHAT
IS NOW THE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD
A. The Amendment
At the conclusion of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia on September
17, 1787, the citizens of the several states took the reins of their country’s future to
ensure they would never again be subjected to a tyrannical aristocracy.24 The
Constitution originally delineated necessary principles such as separation of
powers.25 However, after ratification, the states demanded enumeration of individual
rights.26 A constitutional amendment is not easily accomplished.27 However, James
Madison judiciously distilled the states’ proposals for individual rights into sixteen
suggested amendments.28 Madison introduced the proposed amendments to the First
Congress in 1789.29 One of the amendments to be considered was the prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishments.30 It was met with little resistance from the Members
of Congress.31 However, the House of Representatives’ “Mr. Smith, of South
Carolina objected to the words ‘nor cruel and unusual punishments;’ the import of
them being too indefinite.”32 Mr. Samuel Livermore, of New Hampshire, said that
[t]he clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which
account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning
in it, I do not think it necessary . . . . No cruel and unusual
punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a
man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears
cut off; but are we in future to be prevented from inflicting these
punishments because they are cruel? If a more lenient mode of
correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it could
be invented, it would be very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it;
but until we have some security that this will be done, we ought not
________________________
24.
See The Constitution, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/constitution (last visited
Mar. 15, 2016) (discussing when the United States Constitution was drafted).
25.
See id.
26.
See id.
27.
See Constitutional Amendment Process, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN.,
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/constitution/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2016). To prevent arbitrary changes, the
process for making amendments is rather difficult. See Mary Frances Berry, Amending the Constitution; How Hard
It Is to Change, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/13/magazine/amending-theconstitution-how-hard-it-is-to-change.html. Thus, an amendment may be proposed only by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses of Congress or by a convention called by two-thirds of the states. Constitutional Amendment Process, supra
note 27. The amendment must be ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures or three-fourths of the conventions
called in each state for ratification. Id.
28.
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 518 (4th ed. 2013).
29.
See The Constitution, supra note 24.
30.
See id.
31.
See To Agree to the Senate Amendment to the Constitutional Amendment Resolution, Which Would Alter
the 8th Article, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/1-1/h29 (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (illustrating
that the amendment passed the House by a thirty-seven to fourteen margin in House Vote Number Twenty-Nine in
1789).
32.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782 (1789).
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to be restrained from making necessary laws by any declaration of
this kind.33
Despite Mr. Smith’s objection, the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause became a part of the Constitution through the adoption of the
Bill of Rights.34 Since 1789, however, the exact scope and meaning of this clause
has been troubling for courts.35 The clause’s seemingly indefinite bounds expand as
judicial interpretation conforms to an evolving society.36
B. Judicial Development of the Deliberate Indifference Standard
Chief Justice John Marshall’s pronouncement that “[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,” is as true today
as it was in 1803.37 Therefore, the judiciary has the duty to interpret the Eighth
Amendment so as to protect incarcerated persons from being subjected to cruel and
unusual punishments. Early interpretation decided that “[p]unishments are cruel
when they involve torture or a lingering death . . . [i]t implies . . . something inhuman
and barbarous . . . .”38 What is considered “humane” and “inhumane,” however, is
largely a function of public perceptions at the time the punishment was inflicted.39
The doctrine of deliberate indifference developed through a series of cases
brought by prisoners asserting their Eighth Amendment rights were violated by
prison officials who refused to provide adequate medical care and treated them in a
generally inhumane way.40 In 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States, in
Estelle v. Gamble, established that prisoners have the constitutional right to adequate
medical care.41 Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that
________________________
33.
Id. at 782–83.
34.
See The Constitution, supra note 24.
35.
See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99–100 (1958) (discussing the scope of the Eighth Amendment changes
and that it has not been pinpointed by the Court).
36.
See id. at 99 (discussing how the death penalty is still a widely accepted practice despite the fact that it
has been used throughout history).
37.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); About the Supreme Court, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activityresources/about (last visited Jan. 23, 2017).
38.
In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (emphasis added).
39.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). The Court stated that “an assessment of contemporary
values concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the Eighth Amendment . .
. . [T]his assessment does not call for a subjective judgment. It requires, rather, that we look to objective indicia that
reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction.” Id.
40.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 n.10 (1976) (citing Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.
1974) (doctor’s choosing the “easier and less efficacious treatment” of throwing away the prisoner’s ear and stitching
the stump may be attributable to “deliberate indifference . . . rather than an exercise of professional judgment”);
Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Thomas v. Cannon, 419 U.S. 879 (1974)
(injection of penicillin with knowledge that prisoner was allergic, and refusal of doctor to treat allergic reaction);
Jones v. Lockhart, 484 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1973) (refusal of paramedic to provide treatment); Martinez v. Mancusi,
443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971) (prison physician refuses to administer the prescribed
pain killer and renders leg surgery unsuccessful by requiring prisoner to stand despite contrary instructions of
surgeon)).
41.
Id. at 103–05.
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[a]n inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs
. . . . In the worst cases, such a failure [to render medical care] may
actually produce physical “torture or a lingering death” . . . . In less
serious cases, denial of medical care may result in pain and suffering
which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose.42
Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners, the Court explained,
is the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” which is “repugnant to the
conscience of mankind” that the Eighth Amendment forbids.43 This indifference may
be demonstrated by “prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by
prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or
intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.”44 Therefore, not every
failure to provide medical care is an Eighth Amendment violation.45 Rather, there
must be a component of intentionality behind the prison official’s actions.46
The Supreme Court, in a series of subsequent cases, used the Estelle guideposts
to flesh out what a prisoner is required to show to support an Eighth Amendment
claim.47 The most comprehensive articulation regarding the application of the
deliberate indifference standard was expounded in Farmer v. Brennan.48 In Farmer,
the Court mandated that a prisoner is required to show a “substantial risk of serious
harm” objectively exists and that prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable
state of mind, that is, “deliberate indifference” to a prisoner’s health or safety—
which is equivalent to criminal recklessness.49 Thus, deliberate indifference means
subjective awareness.50 A prison official must: (1) know the underlying facts that
give rise to an inference of a substantial risk of serious harm and must actually draw
________________________
42.
Id. at 103.
43.
Id. at 104, 105 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173; Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,
471 (1947)).
44.
Id. at 104–05.
45.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06 (“[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating
a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical
malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”); see also Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1994) (“[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health
or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was
not averted.”).
46.
See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05.
47.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Seither, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (confirming that deliberate indifference inquiries
require satisfaction of both an objective component—a “sufficiently serious” constitutional deprivation—as well as
a subjective component—officials must act with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind”); see also Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993) (explaining that a prisoner may support the objective prong of the deliberate
indifference inquiry by alleging and proving that he has been—or imminently will be—subjected to a substantial
risk of serious harm). Furthermore, the prisoner must show that “the risk of which he complains is not one that
today’s society chooses to tolerate.” Id. The Court further explained the subjective prong inquiry should be
considered in light of the prison officials’ “current attitudes and conduct” while factoring in “arguments regarding
the realities of prison administration.” Id. at 36, 37.
48.
See generally Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835–39. Coincidentally, Farmer was a transgender inmate who, prior
to her incarceration, had received breast implants and an unsuccessful, black-market testicular removal surgery. Id.
at 829. The issue in the case was whether prison administration acted with deliberate indifference by housing Farmer
in the general population where he was likely to be raped. Id. at 843.
49.
Id. at 836.
50.
Id. at 839–40.
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that inference; and (2) must subsequently disregard the risk.51 It is not enough that a
reasonable official under the circumstances would have known of the risk to the
prisoner’s health or safety; the official must have actually known of, and disregarded,
the risk.52 However, despite a substantial risk of serious harm, a good faith decision
by officials based on legitimate penological concerns, such as safety, may be a
countervailing factor when deciding the appropriate course of action.53
1. Application of the Deliberate Indifference Standard to Treatment of a
Prisoner’s Serious Medical Need
While the jurisdictional jurisprudence may differ among federal circuits, the
fundamental principle pertaining to medical treatment is consistent: the Eighth
Amendment applies to both physical and mental “serious medical needs.”54 For a
medical need to be “serious” it must be one that “has been diagnosed . . . as
mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”55 While a lay person may readily
recognize pain caused by a physical injury or illness, what is less apparent is the
psychological impact a mental illness has on an individual.56 Therefore, courts
routinely rely on a medical expert’s diagnosis to determine whether a serious mental
illness exists.57 Once a prisoner has been diagnosed with GD, courts have found a
serious medical need indeed does exist.58 However, the circuits that have addressed
the issue of providing SRS to inmates with GD have been confronted with a barrage
________________________
51.
See id. at 837, 847.
52.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
53.
See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1993) (describing factoring in “arguments regarding the
realities of prison administration” in the deliberate indifference analysis); see also Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449,
455 (1st Cir. 2011). In Battista, the court stated that
[a]ny professional judgment that decides an issue involving conditions of confinement must
embrace security and administration, and not merely medical judgments . . . . The
administrators are responsible to the state and to the public for making professional judgments
of their own, encompassing institutional concerns as well as individual welfare. Nothing in
the Constitution mechanically gives controlling weight to one set of professional judgments.
Id. (quoting Cameron v. Tomes, 990 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 1993)). But see Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 511
(2005). In Johnson, the court acknowledged that
[t]he full protections of the eighth amendment most certainly remain in force [in prison]. The
whole point of the amendment is to protect persons convicted of crimes . . . . Mechanical
deference to the findings of state prison officials in the context of the eighth amendment
would reduce that provision to a nullity in precisely the context where it is most necessary.
Id. at 511 (quoting Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193–194 (9th Cir. 1979)).
54.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976).
55.
Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass.,
923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990)).
56.
NIH Curriculum Supplement Series [Internet], National Institutes of Health (US) (2007),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK20369/.
57.
See Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Psychiatric Evidence on Trial, 56 SMU L. Rev. 2191, 2195 (2003)
(discussing routine legal cases in which mental health professionals consult).
58.
Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 81.
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of differing expert opinions on whether SRS is a “medically necessary treatment”
for GD.59
a. Legally Recognized Diagnosis and Treatment Criteria for People with GD
For people free from the confines of prison, discussions involving a person’s sex
or gender are gradually becoming commonplace with the progression of society.60
In the area of medical diagnosis, however, sex and gender are “highly controversial”
and have evolved into a “proliferation of terms whose meanings vary over time and
within and between disciplines.”61 For instance, GD has two connotations: (1) as
general descriptive term that “refers to an individual’s affective/cognitive disconnect
with the assigned gender”; and (2) as a diagnostic category that “refers to the distress
that may accompany the incongruence between one’s experienced or expressed
gender and one’s assigned gender.”62 Although one may meet the general descriptive
definition of GD, many do not fit within the diagnostic category.63 People who have
been diagnosed with GD may have become distressed due to the denial of “physical
interventions by means of hormones and/or surgery.”64 People with GD “before
________________________
59.
See id. at 74–82; Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 2015). In Kosilek, Dr.
George Brown noted that the non-surgical treatments were helping, but to maintain these improvements that SRS
was appropriate and medically necessary. Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 74–75. Indeed, four separate experts agreed with Dr.
Brown. Id. at 75–76. However, Dr. Schmidt, Dr. Osborne, and court-appointed expert Dr. Levine all opined that
SRS was not medically necessary. Id. at 76–79. Each dissenting expert expressed concern over whether prisoners
meet the real-life experience requirement of the SOC and stressed that SRS was an elective procedure. Id. at 73. In
Norsworthy, Dr. Ettner and Dr. Gorton stressed that according to the SOC, SRS should be provided to any person
with GD regardless of their institutional setting, and Norsworthy was needlessly suffering. Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp.
3d at 1177–78. Dr. Levine argued prisoners should never receive SRS and stated that “legal advocates exaggerate
the suffering of [GD] . . . through a misunderstanding of its nature.” Id. at 1179.
60.
See, e.g., Ramzy, supra note 2.
61.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 7, at 451 (defining transgender as a broad term that describes a
spectrum of individuals who persistently identify with a gender different than their natal gender).
62.
Id.
63.
See id. at 453.
64.
Id. at 451–53. Medical professionals who follow the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders use the following factors when diagnosing a person with GD:
A. A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and assigned
gender, of at least 6 months’ duration, as manifested by at least two of the following:
1) A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and primary and/or
secondary sex characteristics . . . .
2) A strong desire to be rid of one’s primary and/or secondary sex characteristics because of
marked incongruence with ones experienced/expressed gender . . . .
3) A strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics of the other gender.
4) A strong desire to be of the other gender . . . .
5) A strong desire to be treated as the other gender . . . .
6) A strong conviction that one has the typical feelings and reactions of the other gender . . . .
B. The condition is associated with clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
Id. at 452.
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gender reassignment are at increased risk for suicidal ideation, suicide attempts, and
suicides.”65 However, even after gender reassignment, risk of suicide might persist.66
Once diagnosed with GD, the WPATH SOCs outline the clinical approach
healthcare professionals should follow to treat their patients.67 Incorporation of
cutting edge clinical care, social developments, and political climates were all factors
considered by the WPATH in creation of the SOCs.68 Furthermore, the SOCs apply
in their entirety to all people diagnosed with GD regardless of their housing
situation.69 Indeed, the SOCs specifically preempt any ambiguity by stating that
“[p]eople should not be discriminated against in their access to appropriate health
care based on where they live, including institutional environments such as
prisons.”70 Therefore, treatment options should not be restrained merely because the
patient is in prison. According to the SOCs, treatment for people diagnosed with GD
does not necessarily require the provision of SRS.71 However, for people diagnosed
with severe GD, SRS may be essential and even medically necessary because surgery
is the only way to relieve their distress.72
The SOCs set forth six eligibility conditions that must be met by patients prior
to the provision of SRS:
1) Persistent, well-documented gender dysphoria;
2) Capacity to make a fully informed decision and to consent to
treatment;
3) Age of majority in a given country;
4) If significant medical or mental health concerns are present, they
must be well controlled;
________________________
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 454. (Gender reassignment usually indicates a legal change of gender.).
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 7, at 454.
See SOC, supra note 8, at 1. The WPATH is an
international, multidisciplinary, professional association whose mission is to promote
evidence-based care, education, research, advocacy, public policy, and respect for transgender
health . . . . The overall goal of the SOC is to provide clinical guidance for health professionals
to assist . . . transgender . . . people with safe and effective pathways to achieving lasting
personal comfort with their gendered selves, in order to maximize their overall health,
psychological well-being, and self-fulfillment.

Id.
68.
Id. (describing how WPATH is dedicated to fueling an evolution in health care through changes in public
policy and legal reform).
69.
Id. at 67.
70.
Id. (explaining that “health care for [people diagnosed with GD] living in an institutional environment
should mirror that which would be available to them if they were living in a noninstitutional setting”).
71.
See id. at 8–9 (detailing that treatment for some people diagnosed with GD requires both hormone therapy
and SRS as medically necessary, while for others one treatment or the other is sufficient, and still others do not need
either).
72.
SOC, supra note 8, at 54.
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5) 12 continuous months of hormone therapy as appropriate to the
patient’s gender goals (unless hormones are not clinically indicated
for the individual);
6) 12 continuous months of living in a gender role that is congruent
with the patient’s identity.73
Additionally, the SOCs require two referrals from qualified mental health
professionals who have independently evaluated the patient.74 A qualified mental
health professional, however, is not likely to be a part of a prison’s mental health
staff.75 Accordingly, the proper procedure for prisons to follow is to retain outside
consultants to treat GD prisoners.76 Finally, once the SOC conditions for SRS have
been satisfied, the SOCs make it clear that “[d]enial of needed changes in gender
role or access to treatments, including sex reassignment surgery, on the basis of
residence in an institution are not reasonable accommodations . . . .”77
b. Kosilek v. Spencer and Norsworthy v. Beard, Contradictory Federal Court
Decisions with the Same Underlying Message: Given the Particular Facts and
Circumstances Involved, SRS May Be a Medically Necessary Treatment for
GD
As the progression of medical diagnosis advances, litigants in medical disputes
rely heavily upon expert testimony to prove their cases.78 Some argue that “[l]awyers
need physicians to make their arguments in court persuasive and ‘true.’”79 As an
initial matter, however, in both Kosilek I and Norsworthy, the DOC and the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations (CDCR) did not dispute
that the inmate’s diagnosis of GD constitutes a serious medical need requiring
adequate medical care.80 Rather, the DOC and the CDCR argued that by providing
Kosilek and Norsworthy with an alternative course of treatment such as
psychotherapy, hormones, and the provision of female garb, that it indeed rendered
constitutionally adequate care.81 Therefore, the issue regarding the objective prong
________________________
73.
Id. at 106.
74.
Id. at 27. A “qualified” metal health professional is a person who possesses, among other recommended
credentials, a master’s degree in clinical behavioral science, participates in continuing education pertaining to the
diagnosis and treatment of GD, and maintains a cultural competence to facilitate his or her work with GD patients.
Id. at 22.
75.
See id. at 67–68.
76.
Id.
77.
SOC, supra note 8, at 68 (emphasis added).
78.
See generally Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 225–27 (D. Mass. 2012) (noting that Plaintiff
utilized numerous experts, both private and court-appointed, to prove that the DOC’s refusal to provide SRS
constituted an Eighth Amendment violation). See Davoli, supra note 57.
79.
PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN THE MANAGED CARE ERA 28
(2002).
80.
Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 86 (1st Cir. 2014); Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1187 (N.D.
Cal. 2015).
81.
Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 76, 86; see generally Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1191 (discussing CDCR’s
argument that SRS must be determined to be clinically necessary by an individualized review).
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of the Eighth Amendment analysis was whether SRS was a medically necessary
treatment for prisoners diagnosed with GD who also met the WPATH SOC criteria
that deems SRS medically necessary.82 But judges are not medical experts and
should refrain from applying their own “non-medical” opinions.83 Thus, in reaching
both of their decisions, the courts deciphered what constitutes medically necessary
treatment with the assistance of expert testimony, which applied the SOCs to the
facts and circumstances of each respective case.84 The courts then considered
whether the DOC and the CDCR acted with deliberate indifference by denying
SRS.85
i. The Legal Labyrinth: Kosilek v. Spencer, Procedural Twists and Turns in
the First Circuit
To fully appreciate the extraordinary effort taken by the First Circuit to slow the
natural progression of the legal and medical fields, it is necessary to walk through
the peculiar events leading to its decision. In Kosilek I, the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts was the first federal court to order prison
officials to provide SRS to an inmate.86 Judge Wolf’s lengthy opinion cited strong
agreement with Kosilek’s expert witnesses’ opinions, which urged treatment should
strictly comply with the SOCs, while dismissing the DOC’s expert’s alternative
treatment approach as imprudent.87 Moreover, Judge Wolf held the DOC acted with
deliberate indifference by denying Kosilek’s prescribed medically necessary SRS.88
________________________
82.
See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 68; see Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1185.
83.
See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 88 (discussing an inference the district court in Kosilek used to deem the
viewpoint of a physician as illegitimate).
84.
See id. at 76–77; see Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1177–79.
85.
Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 206 (D. Mass. 2012).
86.
Id. at 196, 251 (stating that “[t]his case is unusual because a transsexual prisoner . . . seeks an
unprecedented court order requiring that the . . . [DOC] provide him with [SRS] to treat his major mental illness,
severe [GD]”); see also Kari Huus, Sex-Change Surgery for Prison Inmate Granted by Judge, NBC NEWS (Sept. 4,
2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/04/13660348-sex-change-surgery-for-prison-inmate-grantedby-judge.
87.
Kosilek, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 202. Judge Wolf stated in his Order:
As the DOC doctors responsible for treating Kosilek and the experts who testified on
Kosilek’s behalf credibly concluded, sex reassignment surgery is the only adequate treatment
for Kosilek’s serious medical need. The DOC’s trial expert, Dr. Chester Schmidt, a
psychiatrist from Johns Hopkins, proposed providing Kosilek with psychotherapy and
antidepressants, rather than sex reassignment surgery. Dr. Schmidt’s recent work focuses
primarily on medical billing procedures rather than treatment of gender identity disorders. Dr.
Schmidt does not accept the Standards of Care . . . followed by prudent professionals. His
approach to dealing with Kosilek’s condition would not be employed by prudent professionals
in the community.
Id. Also, while security concerns are relevant to the Eighth Amendment analysis, here, the DOC’s security concerns
were found to be mere pretext for denying SRS that was “motivated by [the DOC’s fear of] . . . public and political
controversy, criticism, scorn, and ridicule.” Id. at 203, 209.
88.
Id. at 237. The DOC official’s knowledge of and indifference to a qualified physician attesting to the
prospect of continued risk of serious harm to Kosilek’s health if SRS was not provided led the court to conclude that
“[t]he evidence on the record clearly establishes that . . . [the DOC was] aware of facts from which they could infer
that a substantial risk of serious harm to Kosilek existed, and drew the inference.” Id. Furthermore, since denying
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the
district court’s decision in its entirety.89 The court stated:
In sum, where at least three eminently qualified doctors testify
without objection, in accord with widely accepted, published
standards, that Kosilek suffers from a life-threatening disorder that
renders surgery medically necessary, and the factfinder is convinced
by that testimony, we are at a loss to see how this court can properly
overrule that finding of fact.90
However, despite the panel’s reasoned determination, the First Circuit—in a rare and
disfavored move91—granted the DOC’s petition for an en banc rehearing.92 Thus,
the opinion affirming the grant of SRS was withdrawn, and the judgment was
vacated.93 For the rehearing, the full circuit patched together law from other circuits
and non-Eighth Amendment jurisprudence94 to formulate a highly contested,95
“variable exactitude,” standard of review.96
________________________
SRS served no penological purpose, the continued exposure to the serious risk constituted deliberate indifference.
Id. at 247.
89.
See Kosilek v. Spencer, 740 F.3d 733, 773 (1st Cir. 2014). While the district court’s application of law
was scrutinized under de novo review, the First Circuit gave great deference to the lower court’s finding of fact
applying clear error review, holding that
[t]he judge was well-placed to make the factual findings he made, and there is certainly
evidentiary support for those findings. Those findings—that Kosilek has a serious medical
need for the surgery, and that the DOC refuses to meet that need for pretextual reasons
unsupported by legitimate penological considerations—mean that the DOC has violated
Kosilek’s Eighth Amendment rights. The court did not err in granting Kosilek the injunctive
relief she sought.
Id. at 761–62, 772–73.
90.
Id. at 766.
91.
Hearing a case en banc empowers the full circuit court to overturn a decision rendered by a three-judge
panel. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (“An en banc hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered
unless: (1) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions; or (2) the
proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.”) (emphasis added).
92.
Kosilek, 740 F.3d 733 (order granting rehearing en banc).
93.
Id.
94.
See Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 84–85 (1st Cir. 2014) (utilizing case law from four different federal
circuits, along with Fourth Amendment decisions, to explain that “an Eighth Amendment claim of inadequate
medical care encompasses a multitude of questions that present elements both factual and legal,” which require a
varying level of deference to the lower court’s factual findings).
95.
Id. at 96–97 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s varying exactitude standard
amounted to a sweeping de novo review of both fact and law that “[a]rmed [the majority] with the ability to take a
fresh look at findings that clearly warranted deference . . . [it] easily steps into the trial judge’s shoes—the inarguable
superiority of the judge’s ability to marshal facts, assess motive, and gauge credibility [were] all but forgotten”); see
also Brief for Civil Procedure Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6, Kosilek v. O’Brien, 2015 WL
1776459 (2015) (No. 14-1120) (following the reversal by the en banc court, a group of legal scholars supported
Kosilek’s petition to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari, asserting that the First Circuit
violated defining principals of the clearly erroneous standard of review, required by Rule 52, by applying de novo
review to all of the district court’s findings); see FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral
or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to
the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”) (emphasis added).
96.
See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 84 (reasoning that review of mixed questions of law and fact is of variable
exactitude, meaning the more grounded in law the question is, the less deference is given to the district court’s
conclusions).

https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol22/iss1/5

12

: Sex Reassignment Surgery & the New Standard of Care

Fall 2016

Sex Reassignment Surgery & the New Standard of Care

105

With the “degree-of-deference continuum” relegated to zero, and without
witnessing live testimony, the First Circuit conducted an independent credibility
assessment of the expert witnesses.97 The circuit court relied on the trial testimony
of Dr. Levine, a medical expert appointed by the district court.98 Dr. Levine, who
was the chairman of the committee that drafted the fifth version of the SOCs, testified
that medical professionals can reasonably differ as to what the minimally adequate
treatment for GD is.99 Running with that opinion, the circuit court quickly disposed
of the district court’s finding that the DOC’s expert’s testimony was outside the
realm of prudent medical treatment.100 A difference in medical opinions concerning
treatment options, the circuit court reasoned, does not necessarily mean one opinion
is imprudent.101 The circuit court held that the DOC’s choice between “one of two
alternatives—both of which are reasonably commensurate with the medical
standards of prudent professionals, and both of which provide Kosilek with a
significant measure of relief—is a decision that does not violate the Eighth
Amendment.”102
Although there is much criticism concerning the circuit court’s decision to grant
the en banc rehearing and the lack of deference given to the lower court’s findings,
the prospect of SRS being a medically necessary treatment in prison was not legally
barred. The circuit court stressed that
this case presents unique circumstances; we are simply unconvinced
that our decision on the record before us today will foreclose all
litigants from successfully seeking SRS in the future. Certain facts
in this particular record—including the medical providers’ nonuniform opinions regarding the necessity of SRS, Kosilek’s criminal
history, and the feasibility of postoperative housing—were
important factors impacting the decision.103
Thus, with the passage of time and the proper set of facts, the First Circuit will
have no choice but to evolve with the medical field as SRS becomes more
“uniformly” recognized as medically necessary.
ii. Recognized SOC Rules the Day: Norsworthy v. Beard
Norsworthy filed her first formal request for SRS less than two weeks after the
decision in Kosilek I was released.104 She felt that “it was the first time an opportunity
________________________
97.
Id. at 84–85, 87–89.
98.
Id. at 87–89. Dr. Levine was later retained by the CDCR as an expert regarding inmate requests for SRS
in Norsworthy. See Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
99.
Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 227 (D. Mass. 2012); Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 88.
100.
See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 87–88.
101.
Id. at 88.
102.
Id. at 90.
103.
Id. at 91. Also, the court explained that correctional administrators wishing to avoid treatment cannot
seek out a single professional willing to attest that some well-accepted treatment is not necessary. Id. at 90 n.12.
104.
Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1173–74 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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was provided to transgenders that said the State had to listen to [her]” and that before
then the thought of a formal request for SRS was “absurd” and “like ramming your
head into a wall.”105 It was. Despite being armed with numerous doctor
recommendations explicitly insisting that she receive SRS as a clinical and medical
necessity, Norsworthy’s requests were repeatedly denied.106 Thus, she followed
Kosilek’s lead by filing an Eighth Amendment claim in federal court.107
In his opinion, Judge Jon Tigar of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California wastes little time before giving credence to the
WPATH SOCs.108 Specifically, he pounces on the opportunity to mirror the SOC
treatment guidelines.109 He emphasizes that in some instances adequate treatment for
GD can be non-surgical, however in more severe cases, relief from GD cannot be
achieved without SRS.110 This principal of an individualized treatment for each
prisoner’s specific ailments is consistent with the SOCs as well as Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.111 Thus, when the CDCR presented the testimony of Dr.
Levine, who supported the CDCR’s blanket ban on the provision of SRS,112 the court
swiftly labeled Norsworthy’s repeated denials an Eighth Amendment violation.113
While the Ninth Circuit did not endorse the decision in Kosilek, it did adopt the
First Circuit’s condemnation of an institution intentionally seeking out a medical
provider for the sole purpose of overriding Norsworthy’s treating medical
professional’s recommendation for SRS.114 The CDCR was ordered to promptly
provide Norsworthy with her medically necessary SRS.115 The state filed an appeal,
however, and the Governor of California released Norsworthy one day before the
Ninth Circuit was set to hear the appeal, rendering the case moot.116
III. THE INHERENT PROBLEMS WITH PROVIDING SRS TO PRISONERS WITH GD
AND HOW SOCIETY, THE STATES, AND THE MEDICAL FIELD MAY HAVE
ALREADY RESOLVED THEM
As the above section illustrates, there are many tangential issues related to the
core Eighth Amendment determination. The path in which society develops plays an
integral role. Today, cultural advancements have spurred a national atmosphere of
________________________
105.
Id. at 1174.
106.
Id. at 1173–74, 1176.
107.
See id. at 1173, 1180–81.
108.
Id. at 1170–71 (highlighting that the WPATH SOCs are recognized as authoritative by the American
Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and the American Psychological Association).
109.
See id. at 1187; see SOC, supra note 8, at 60.
110.
Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1171.
111.
Id. at 1170, 1191–92. (discussing prior cases where individualized treatments were requirements).
112.
Id. at 1189 (discussing Dr. Levine’s negative view on SRS on those in custody).
113.
Id. at 1193–94.
114.
Id. at 1191–92.
115.
Id. at 1195.
116.
Associated Press, supra note 20; Paige St. John, Transgender Prison Inmate Seeking Sex-Reassignment
Surgery Will Be Released, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-transgenderprison-inmate-seeking-sex-change-will-be-paroled-20150807-story.html.
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intolerance.117 Intolerance for inequality.118 The result has been what it has been
throughout history—passionate advocates pushing the law up the steep hill of
change. It is a struggle; change is hard, but with the assistance of out-of-court
influences, the burden of change is lessened.
A. A Sign of the Times: Societal Influences
The culture in American society is shifting. For instance, recently a transgender
high school student who was born male but identifies as a female fought against her
school district for not permitting her to use the women’s locker room.119 The school
district attempted to accommodate her by providing her with her own changing
room;120 but separate is not equal.121 Thus, rather than risk losing millions in federal
grant money, the district settled the claim and now allows access to locker rooms
based on gender identity.122
Another example of marked societal shift is in the world of sports. The
International Olympic Committee (IOC) was the first athletic body to adopt a policy
of inclusion regarding transgender athletes.123 The IOC’s policy specifies only those
who have (1) undergone SRS; (2) had hormone treatments for at least two years; and
(3) received legal recognition of their transitioned sex, can participate consistent with
their gender identities.124 Recently, transgender students have also been permitted to
participate in school sports in accordance with their gender identity.125
Finally, the most significant step society has taken toward acknowledging SRS
as a medically necessary treatment is its coverage under Medicare. In May 2014,
SRS was de-classified as an “experimental treatment”; therefore, requests for
transition related surgeries will be evaluated on an individual basis and covered if
deemed medically necessary.126 In reaching its revolutionary decision, the
Department of Health and Human Services’ Appeals Board consulted the WPATH
SOCs.127
________________________
117.
See Jack Markell & Randi Weingarten, We All Have Role in Fight Against LGBT Discrimination, CNN
(May 12, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/12/opinions/north-carolina-restroom-law-markell-weingarten/.
118.
See generally id.
119.
Duaa Eldeib, Transgender Student Who Fought District 211 Gets Locker Room Access, CHI. TRIBUNE
(Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/schaumburg-hoffman-estates/news/ct-transgenderstudent-deadline-district-211-met-20160114-story.html.
120.
Id.
121.
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1952) (asserting that the separate but equal doctrine has no
place in the realm of public education).
122.
Eldeib, supra note 119.
123.
Cathryn B. Lucas-Carr & Vikki Krane, What Is the T in LGBT? Supporting Transgender Athletes
SPORT
PSYCHOLOGIST
532,
541
(2011),
Through
Sport
Psychology,
THE
http://www.humankinetics.com/acucustom/sitename/Documents/DocumentItem/06-Lucas-532-548.pdf.
18,
2004),
124.
Transsexual
Athletes
OK
for
Athens,
CNN INTERNATIONAL (May
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/SPORT/05/17/olympics.transsexual/.
125.
High
School
Policies
for
Transgender
Student
Athletes,
TRANSATHLETE,
http://www.transathlete.com/#!k-12/c4w2 (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
126.
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., DOCKET NO. A-13-87, DEPARTMENTAL APPEALS BOARD, NCD
140.3, Transsexual Surgery (2014).
127.
Id. at 7, 9–10.
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B. The Influence of the Medical Field
The incorporation of cultural advancement into the WPATH SOCs is just one
example of how the medical field has raised the bar as to what is considered
constitutionally adequate treatment for inmates diagnosed with GD.128 Further, a
recent survey conducted of 137 medical schools teaching LGBT-related topics in the
required curriculum, 30.3% reported to have instruction on gender transitioning, and
34.8% reported to have instruction on SRS.129 Moreover, medical students are
advocating for more required courses to keep up with transgender people’s healthcare needs.130 Consequently, medical experts versed in the WPATH SOCs will be
more commonplace, and people—including those incarcerated—diagnosed with GD
will be more likely to receive medically necessary SRS.
C. State Contributions
Recently, state prison systems have gotten into the habit of releasing transgender
inmates who demand adequate medical care.131 This pattern of releasing inmates
rather than providing them with adequate medical care cannot be permitted to
continue. Each state must develop a comprehensive organizational scheme for
dealing with transgender inmates. Thus, shortly after Norsworthy’s release,
California adopted a policy for treating inmates with GD that closely conforms to
the WPATH SOCs.132 Moreover, the policy indicates that post-operative transgender
prisoners will be housed in a prison according to their gender identity.133 While
California’s SRS and housing policy is in no way binding on other states, it certainly
makes it easier for transgender inmates to point to California when their respective
________________________
128.
SOC, supra note 8, at 1 n.2 (“Version 7 represents a significant departure from previous versions.
Changes in this version are based upon significant cultural shifts, advances in clinical knowledge, and appreciation
of the many health care issues that can arise for transsexual, transgender, and gender nonconforming people beyond
hormone therapy and surgery.”) (emphasis added).
129.
Juno Obedin-Maliver et al., Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender–Related Content in
Undergraduate Medical Education, JOURNAL OF THE AM. MED. ASS’N (Sept. 7, 2011),
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=1104294.
130.
Tehreem Rehman, Physicians Must Not Lag Behind National Policy on Transgender Discrimination, INTRAINING (Nov. 25, 2015), http://in-training.org/physicians-must-not-lag-behind-national-policy-transgenderdiscrimination-10091.
131.
See, e.g., Deborah Sontag, Transgender Inmate Who Sued Georgia Gets Unexpected Parole, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/01/us/transgender-inmate-who-sued-georgia-gets-unexpectedparole.html (“[T]ransgender inmate who sued Georgia in February for access to hormone therapy and protection
against prison rape, was unexpectedly paroled on Monday after serving less than a third of a 12-year sentence . . .
.”);
Diane
Walker,
Transgender
Inmate
Granted
Parole,
NBC12
(Jan.
25,
2014),
http://www.nbc12.com/story/24466381/transgender-inmate-granted-parole (“A transgender Virginia prisoner,
seeking sex change surgery paid for by the state, has been granted parole . . . after serving more than three decades
of a 73-year prison sentence [for bank robbery, after] ‘no one in [her] family thought they would be living, when
she walked free.’”).
132.
See Richard Pérez-Peña, California Is First State to Adopt Sex Reassignment Surgery Policy for
Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/22/us/california-is-first-state-to-adoptsex-reassignment-surgery-policy-for-prisoners.html; see SOC, supra note 8, at 54–68.
133.
See James Queally, San Francisco Jails to House Transgender Inmates Based on Gender Preference,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-transgender-san-francisco-jails20150910-story.html (explaining that prison officials said that California can be a model for the nation to follow on
how to safely house transgender prisoners).
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state prison system denies prescribed medically necessary SRS on feasibility
grounds.
IV. CONCLUSION
A brief look into the history of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause illustrates its seemingly “indefinite” bounds. Whether inmates
with GD truly “suffer” the way the SOC indicates, I do not know. I am not a
“qualified medical health professional.” Neither are the courts. Therefore, for Eighth
Amendment claims alleging SRS is medically necessary, proper application of the
deliberate indifference standard depends upon medical expert testimony. As our
legal and medical fields evolve over time, cultural shifts influence both. The
evolving standards of society will likely render imprudent any legal or medical
professional who holds a view contrary to the recognized SOCs. Thus, for inmates
with GD, SRS will be the new constitutional SOCs.
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